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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No.

RO,VLAND S. BINGHAM and
KATHERINE C. BINGHAM,
his wife, et al,

10,831

Defendants-Respondents.

Defendants' - Respondents' Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as the facts developed at the trial are
very important to a decision of this case, and because
defendants take sharp issue with many of the assertions
of fact made by the plaintiff in its brief, it is felt that
a complete restatement of the facts is in order. If the
actual facts were as simple as those stated by plaintiff,
its position might have a degree of merit; however, the
facts are otherwise.
1

The defendants owned a tract of land, consisting
of 9.4 acres, located in Riverdale, Weber County, Utah,
through which the plaintiff ran a portion of its Interstate Freeway (Exh. I). This particular tract of land
lay on a bluff, or bench area, above the older settled
portion of Riverdale ( T. 7) , and was in an area which
was being converted from orchard to residential use
(T. IO). At the time of the condemnation the entire
tract was considered by all of the appraisers as having
a highest and best use for residential purposes, with
an interim orchard use during the necessary conversion
period.
This particular property was choice property, both
for orchard and residential purposes (T. 46, 47, 83, 84),
and the appraisers for both the landowners and the
state variously valued all of the acres in the tract between $3,500.00 and $4,500.00 per acre. In its original
condition the entire tract sloped slightly from the southeast to the northwest, at which point it fronted upon
I200 West Street, where there were located the usual
utilities ( T. 9) of electricity, telephone, gas, water and
sewer. Riverdale zoning (T. IO) for the subject prop·
erty permitted either agricultural use or residential
building lots having not less than I0,000 square feet per
lot.
-As shown on Exhibit I, and from the resolution
of taking set forth in the Amended Complaints, the
plaintiff not only took a strip of land on the westerly
end of the entire Bingham holdings where direct access
to I200 West Street was located, but it further con·
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demned all of the access rights to the remaining lands
east of the freeway along their South border against
Riverdale Ro.ad. The Exhibit further shows a narrow
triangular piece of land on the East boundary of the
remaining tract, owned by Hank Dee, which was a steep
hill property along the top of which ran the East line
of the Binghams' remaining tract-at a location approximately 26 feet higher than 1500 West Street (T.
18). Thus, the only logical appearing route to secure
aecess to some road system from the remaining tract
would have to lie in a northerly direction, as will be
subsequently discussed.
Plaintiff states in its brief that these defendants
operated their properties-which were previously portions of their father's larger farm-as a family operation; however, the facts are to the contrary. A reading
of Mr. Bingham's testimony (T. 29) indicates that it
was operated as a family farm prior to the time that
the three sons (of which Roland Bingham was one)
acquired their own individual tracts. Actually, Roland
Bingham and his wife had for many years secured their
entire living from the orchard located on the 9.4 acre
tract, except for some supplemental income derived
from driving a Weber County school bus (T. 10).
Taking issue with another statement of fact made
by plaintiff in its brief to the effect that Roland Bingham prepared plans and had discussions with his brothers for a joint subdivision development of their properties (Br. 3), Roland Bingham testified that he had
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worked up sketches for a proposed subdivision of his
own property (utilizing the prior access to 1200 West
Street) before the freeway came into the picture (T.
32-33), but that when he attempted to sketch alternate
subdivision plans involving his brother's property located north of his remaining landlocked tract after
knowledge of the freeway came into being, his brother
stated: "I don't want to fool with it" (T. 32-33).
Because plaintiff treated another matter as being
a fact, to-wit: that Ezra Bingham owned the land to
·the north of the landlocked tract (Br. 12) , a clarification of the facts in this respect is in order. Actually,
there were two separate properties lying north of the
landlocked tract between it and the nearest highway.
One parcel was owned by Ezra Bingham and his wife
Helen ( T. 24) . The other parcel, lying contiguous to
and on the north side of the Ezra Bingham tract, was
owned by another brother, Golden Bingham (T. 26).
Critical to any factual analysis of this case is the
statement made on page 7 of plaintiff's brief, as follows:
"
there is no dispute to the proposition
that if access was available they would have no
severance damage. "
The foregoing statement is unsupported by any
reference to the record and is sharply controverted by
defendants. The true facts will be covered in subsequent argument.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CONDEM~ A'l'ION PROCEEDING IS ON THE CONDE~INOR TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE WHICH
l\IINll\11.ZES THE DAMAGES TO THE
LANDOWNER'S
REMAINING
PROPERTIES.
The State Road Commission, in its brief, suggests
that before the landowners can obtain any severance
damage whatsoever they must show by evidence the
unavailability of substitute lands which would cure the
problems connected with loss of access. As authority
for this proposition the State cites the two Utah cases
of Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103
Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777 (1943), and State v. Cooperative Security Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 2d 269 (1952). However, neither of these two cases squarely faced the issue
of burden of proof in convincing the jury of the avoidance or minimization of damages, nor did they specifically mention burden of proof or expressly impose
the burden of proof on a particular party.
In contradistinction with these two cases the general rule, sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of
avoidable consequences", expressly imposes the burden
of proof upon the party committing the wrong. 25A
C.J.S., Damages, Section 144 e (1966). In speaking
of this doctrine of avoidable consequences, the State
5

quotes from page 127 of McCormick on Damages
( 1935) . Turning to page 130 of the same section of
this treatise the author speaks of the burden of proof.
"Nevertheless, though by the better view the
defendant need not plead it, he does have the burden of proof. He must bring forward evidence
that the plaintiff could reasonably have reduced
his loss or avoided injurious consequences, and
he must finally convince the jury of this in order
to succeed on this issue."

It is obvious from the above quotation that the
general rule as applied to non-condemnation cases is
there expressed. In a condemnation case the labels of
the parties are merely reversed. Nevertheless, the gen- '
eral rule expressly states that the uninjured party must ,
bring forward evidence that the injured party could
reasonably have reduced his loss or avoided injurious
consequences.

The reporters abound with non-condemnation cases
which impose the burden of proof on the uninjured
party. However, citations will be reserved for eminent
domain cases.
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Burden of Proof,
Section 18.5, is discussed the minority rule placing
upon the condemnor the burden of showing the extent
of damages. In referring to those jurisdictions, such
as Utah, where the burden of showing damages is upon
the landowner, the writer states on page 301:
"Even in those jurisdictions where the general
rule prevails, the burden is on the condemnor to
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produce evidence which mznzmzzes the value or
damage."
(Emphasis added).
As authority for the above statement of law
Nichols cites the Utah case of Sigurd City v. State,
105 Utah 278, 142 P. 2d 154 (1943). That case and
the cases cited therein are the only Utah cases found
by this writer which directly and expressly deal with
the issue of burden of proof in minimizing damages.
The Sigurd City case was a condemnation case
i1wo1Ying the condemnation by a municipal corporation
of water
. rights held by the State of Utah and other
private individuals. The condemnor sought by the action
to diYert waters at the head of Rosses Creek. Rosses
Creek flowed into Petersons Creek, which in turn
flowed into .Meadow Creek. Defendants diverted their
water for irrigation at points on the latter two streams.
During the course of the trial experts testified as to
the loss of water between the diversion points by evaporation and seepage. Considering the evaporation and
seepage this Court held that the trial court erred in
basing defendants' damages upon the quantity of water
taken by plaintiff and not the quantity of water which
defendants would have placed to a beneficial use and
which they were actually deprived of at their diversion
points.
'

'Vith regard to this minimization of damages hy
proof that the volume of water taken by the plaintiff
was less than the volume of that to whi~h use the de-

7

fendants were deprived, this Court stated on page 158:

"In determining the volume and quantity of
water, the use of which the defendants were deprived of, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants were not deprived of the use of as much
water as the plaintiff took into its pipelines at
Rosses Creek. Howcroft v. Union & Jordan Irr.
Co., 25 Utah 311, 71P.487; Mountain Like Mining Co. v. JJfidway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149
P. 929; Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sut- '
ton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P. 2d 682; Midway Irr. Co.
v. Smoke Creek JJf. & T. Co. 8 Cir. 271 F. 157, '
affirmed, 260 U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed.
423; Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P.
1092."
(Emphasis added).

The rule as stated in the Sigurd City case is in consonance with every case or authority found by this
writer where the issue of burden of proof was expressly
ruled upon. In fact, the two Utah cases of Provo River
Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d
777 (1943), and State v. Cooperative Security Corp. ,
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 122 Utah 134,
247 P. 2d 269 (1952), stand alone as the only two
cases found by this writer in any jurisdiction where
there is any inference that the burden of showing a
reduction in his own damages is placed upon the defendant landowner in a condemnation case. Further·
more, any inference from these two cases that the
burden of proof is upon the landowner is in direct con·
flict with the express language of this Court in the
Sigurd City case.

8

The Carlson case was the first of these two cases
decided by this Court. As sole authority for the proposition that the landowner should minimize the damages
to his remaining lands by the purchase of comparable
lands, this Court cited the case of City of St. Louis v.
St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S. W.
107 (1917). A thorough reading of the St. Louis case
reveals that at no place within that opinion was the burden of proof of factors minimizing damages ever discussed. However, that opinion does make it clear that aftirmative evidence was adduced at the trial showing the
arnilability of an equally commodious, convenient, economical, and accessible parcel for $51,000.00. That testimony was obviously elicited by the condemning agency.
In the case at bar no such evidence was brought before
the court. The State of Utah has utterly failed to show
by affirmative evidence the availability of comparable
land for access purposes such as will replace the landowners to their status quo ante capiendum.
That the Carlso1L case merely assumed the burden
to be on the landowner, without so deciding, is made
clear by the dissent of Justice Larson on page 783:
"The prevailing opinion assumes the burden
was on Carlson to show he could not retrieve his
losses by the purchase of other lands. It is elemental that the condemnor has the burden of
showing offsets or other facts which might lessen
the damages directly resulting or other facts
which might lessen the damages directly resulting
to the condemnee from the interference with his
property rights."
(Emphasis added).

9

The Church Farm case was decided some 10 years
after the Carlson case and cited the latter case and the
St. Louis case as authority. Again this Court made no
specific mention of the burden of proof but did refer
to the requirement that the proof show that no comparable lands were available in the area of the condemned land. The Court held against the landowner
since the evidence affirmatively showed the availability
of comparable land. That the State proved the availability of comparable lands is made clear on page 272,
where the Court said:
"Since the evidence shows that this property
could have been replaced there was no basis for
the award of severance damage except as to the
two small tracts."
Cases such as the Sigurd City case, where the court
specifically imposed upon the condemnor the burden
of showing by clear and convincing evidence factors
tending to reduce or mitigate damages, are to be found
in a number of states. In fact, the authorities are so
uniform that the rule has been stated in general form
by legal encyclopedias.
"The condemnor must prove that it has complied with statutory requirements that it endeavor to agree with the landowner as to the compensation; and it is for the condemnor to show
matters which tend to reduce or mitigate the damages. The condemning authority also has the
burden of showing facts excusing delay in the
payment of the damages." 29A C.J.S., Eminent
Domain, Section 271.
(Emphasis added).
10
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This quotation by C.J.S. was cited with approval
in the case of Roth v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1 of Lancaster County, 156 Neb. 444, 56 N. W. 2d 741 (1953).
Also in the Nebraska case of Application of Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 N eh.
609, 620, 68 N. W. 2d 200 (1955), where the issue dealt
with the admissibility of photographs depicting topography, the court stated:
"The general rule is that the burden of showing the damages which the landowner or lessee
will suffer rests on him while the burden is on
the petitioner to show matters which end to mitigate the damages."
The case of Application of Board of Ed. of Union
Free School District, 216 N. Y. S. 2d 811, 816 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961), offers an interesting twist on the facts
here presented. In that case the land involved was apparently originally landlocked.
"As above noted, petitioner also argues that
all of the lots on the Mess11pequa Park map must
be depreciated 65% because they are landlocked.
Of course, if property is landlocked, its value
is substantially reduced, ... The burden of proof
of the value of a damage (sic) parcel is upon
the claimant, but the burden of going forward
with evidence establishing matters which minimize or mitigate claimants' damages is on the
condemning authority, ... " (Citing authority).
The cases of State v. Dunclick, 286 P. 2d 1112
(Idaho 1955), and Jeffery v. Osborne, 145 Wis. 351,
129 N. W. 931 (1911), can both be cited for the propo-
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sition that the condemning authority has the burden
of proving the availability of comparable lands which
will mitigate or substantially eliminate the severance
damage caused the landowner. In both of these cases the
condemnor failed to carry its burden of proof.
As can be seen from a reading of the two cases,
the burden placed upon the condemnor is not a simple
one of merely showing the availability of a nearby
tract of land. The Wisconsin case makes it clear that
the courts are extremely reluctant to force the landowner to swap land for the accommodation of the condemnor. In that case the court held that the availability
of other lands in the immediate vicinity at a moderate
price could not be shown to reduce the damages tu
which the landowner was entitled. It was said to be
immaterial that the landowner could move part of his
plant to other land for the purpose of giving the condemnor a right-of-way.

In the Idaho case the court specifically found that
the respondent (State) had not carried its burden of
proof by merely offering to sell an adjacent tract owned
by the State of Idaho. The Court required more detail ,
and specificity in the following language found on
page<, 1114:

"The consideration to be paid, or conditions
under which the convey~1ce tendered could or
would be made to appellants, the cost of improv· '
ing the claimed available land to make it adaptable to appellant's use, the cost of re-adjustment
12

to appellants' plant to make practical use of the
new location, or what sum would necessarily be
required to be expended in order to rehabilitate
the property for such use and replace the plant
in status quo ante capiendum were not shown.
If respondent desires to prove facts for the
purpose of mitigating or minimizing the damages
sustained to the remainder, proof of availability
or other land adjacent to appellants' plant, standing alone with nothing more, is insufficient for
such purpose."
A Utah case similar to the latter two cited cases
is Southern Pacific Cornpany v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960). In that case this Court held
that evidence of the unavailability of other lands would
be immaterial because other lands would not return
the damaged tract to its status quo ante capiendum by
serving the same purpose.
This same requirement that the substitute lands
should be so comparable as to leave the landowner in
substantially the same position as before the taking is
laid down in the Church Farm case, supra, and in the
Carlson case, supra. The Carlson opinion particularly
is replete with words and phrases requiring that the
substitute land give the same relative results.
"The purchase of a tract of land which produces the sarne relative results Carlson obtained
from the pasture tract prior to condemnation,
offsetting the advantages against the disadvantages, would be the controlling factor in the determination of market value of the pasture condemned, whether a greater or lesser acreage
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would be required, due consideration being given
to type and amount of feed produced, water
available, and the location of the land with respect to other properties owned by Carlson. ,
If he could purchase other pasture lands or farm
land convertible into pasture, within a distance
from his barns comparable to that of the condemned tract, and such other land would provide relatively the same kind of forage for the
same number of cows or forage of equal rationvalue throughout the seven months he used the
wild pasture tract, it could not be contended that
his properties in Charleston could be impaired or
depreciated by taking the pasture. If another tract
of equal forage-producing value and convenience
could be substituted for the tract condemned,
whether larger or smaller in area, the defendant
would be in relatively the same positon he was in
before the construction of the reservoir. See City
of St. Louis v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., 272
Mo. 80, 197 S. ,V. 107." (Emphasis addedL
Provo River 1Vater Users Ass'n v. Carlson,
103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777, 781 (1943).
The cited authority of the Carlson case, City of St.
Louis v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197
S. W. 107, 112 (1917), is even more specific as to the
requirement that the substitute lands serve the identical
function.
"In cases where no available property is owned

bv him whose land is taken, the price at which

other lands adjacent, equally as valuable intrin·
sically, as convenient, as economical in use, and
as accessible, and which can be bought, may. be
shown as measuring the amount of depreciat10n
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to which the lands damaged but not physically
taken, have been subjected."
(Emphasis added).
The placing of the burden of proving avoidance
or minimization of damages upon the condemning
ageuc:y is based upon both case authority and sound
reasoning. Sound reasoning dictates that proof be affirmative and specific. Only the condemnor is motivated
to show affirmatively that a particular tract of land
is arnilable as a replacement for land taken. Only the
eondemnor is motivated to show affirmatively that a
particular piece of land is equally as a convenient, economical, and accessible as the tract taken. For the
larnlowuer to obtain the degree of specificity required
by case law and still show the unavailability of all
nearby tracts is an onerous burden. By an affirmative
showing of availability the State could carry its burden
with minimal use of valuable judicial time; however,
the landowner would be required to negative the availability of many nearby tracts at the expense of time
in order to carry the burden were such burden to be
imposed upon him.
The cases cited by plaintiff involve situations
where, by the acquisition of property similar and comparable to the properties taken, a property unit can be
brought back to its former utility and use in substantially all respects. On the other hand, it is easy to realize
that few cases involving mitigation of damages can be
found where a tract of land has become landlocked as
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a result of condemnation action. In the ordinary case
it would often be extremely difficult to furnish a property owner with access to a landlocked parcel of land
which would measure up to the type of access previously had, thereby creating serious problems as to
the amount of mitigation of damages.
\Vhile the principle of mitigation of damages should
certainly be applicable to landlocked parcels, the access
problem and resulting damages should properly be
related to a consideration of the evidence submitted
by both sides rather than handled through the route
of what in fact would constitute, as plaintiff would
have it, a motion for a non-suit.

As a matter of fact, in both the CarlYon and the
Church Farrn cases, the evidence relating to the other
available lands, while not precisely in point with the
problem here involved since they were not access cases,
was raised by the condemnor' s cross-examination or by
its evidence showing the availability of other lands.

Coming more specifically to the access problem
and the evidence in this case, the plaintiff did in fact
explore what appeared to it to be the only logical means ,
of furni.shing defendants with physical access to their
remaining properties. As shown by the Complaint and
State's Exhibit I, there existed a 20 foot wide "legal
opening" at the northeast corner of the defendants'
remaining 6.44 acre tract of land (parcel A), bordering
1500 \Vest Street in Riverdale. This opening was lo16

cated at a point, according to YVilliam l\1arsden-the
plaintiff's engineer - which was 12 feet higher than
1.)00 \Yest Street (T. llO), but well below the top of
;1 -;teep ridge bordering 1500 'Vest Street, which ridge
or bank was about 26 feet high ( T. 18). To get an idea
as to the physical appearance of the ridge or bank
bordering the east side of the defendants' remaining
rroperty, one need only look at defendants' Exhibit
l;. This Exhibit shows the east bank (looking westerl~·
from 1.)00 "'est Street, the top portion of which ran
aloug the entire east line of defendants' remaining landlocked property.
It was in the vicinity of this particular bank that
the plaintiff did in fact attempt to work out some means
of acx:ess for defendants so as to reach their remaining
properties. Plaintiff's engineer, l\Ir ..Marsden, actually
disc:ussed the possibility of an access route in that area
with Roland Bingham ( T. l13). In fact, l\Ir ..Marsden
admitted that the State Road Commission engaged
Templeton Engineers, a private engineering firm, to
study the general area to determine if an access could
he made ( T. 1 H). Also, l\Ir. :Marsden personally undertook to study the possibility of an access to the remaining properties and made the following obsenations on cross-examination by l\fr. Fuller:

A . . . . but I know that it was very difficult to
provide a route directly west along the northerly property line. But I don't recall what
we tried to do to the south, along the easterly
property line.

* * *
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Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Bingham that you
viewed the access at that point to be impossible, except at a great amount of money!

A. Yes. The money that I testified to earlier
would only be the portion that would have
to be spent right at that location. Not the
total amount required to do the entire job.
(T. ll5)
Mr. Marsden indicated that any access which might
be created in the indicated area would only serve for
possible agricultural uses, and that it would not be
adequate for purposes related to the highest and best
use of the properties for residential construction. His
comments continue on further cross-examination by
Mr. Fuller:
Q. Am I correct, or not, in this assumption.
That from your observation and study of this
particular area, to put a road into the Bingham property that would suitably accomplish
the desired access, would be too costly from
an economic standpoint? Is that true or not?

A. It would depend on what purpose the road
was placed there for. In other words is this
a rural access or is this an urban access?

Q. Let's take an urban access.
A. It would be very costly for an urban access.
(T. ll8)
On re-cross examination Mr. Marsden continued:
Q. So one would come in with agricultural
equipment. at that point, and make a rather
sharp turn?
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A. That is correct.

Q. And come on up that property to some point
near the south end, where it would finally
level out?
A. That's correct.

Q. You would not propose that type of an entry
or approach for an urban-type development,
would you?
A. No.
MR. FULLER: No further questions.
(T. 120)
Mr. Marsden's entire testimony relating to any
possible means of access at the east end of the landlocked properties necessarily contemplated a possible
use of the properties belonging to the neighbor on the
east-Hank Dee. However, since the Dee property
was built against this same bank on the west side of
1500 \Vest Street, the possible availability of a portion
of that property for an approach road to the defendants' properties would have added nothing, nor would
it have simplified the problems testified to by Mr.
Marsden.
Roland Bingham was recalled for further
examination he further substantiated Mr. Marsden's
analysis of the access problem, stating that Mr. Marsden
told him on the telephone~rhen

" ... That the State had secured a private
engineer to try to figure means of entry to this
property."
(T. 153)
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Further, l\Ir. l\Iarsden informed Bingham as tr!
any means of access, that" 'It's impossible, but nothing is impossible if
you have got plenty of money.' And that's as far
as it went."
(T. 15oJ

The suggestion made by plaintiff in its brief that
an alternate route could be secured from the north of
the landlocked parcel through lands belonging to
brothers of the defendants is here submitted to hare
been simply an afterthought which was never seriously
contemplated by the plaintiff. It was only after thi1
"possible", but unsatisfactory, route came into the case
through witnesses for the defendant that the State
took any cognizance of such an approach. Oddly '
enough, in its brief plaintiff now seeks to suggest a
northerly route to reach the landlocked property, Lut
is strangely quiet as to the only route which it in fact
seriously felt furnished any kind of access route. A ~
further discussion of this point will be handled in the
next point of argument.

Recognizing the type of problem that exists in such
a situation as we have here, the Utah legislature in 19!5.3 ,
added the following pertinent provisions to the Utah
Highway Code:
27-12-96 ACQUISITION OF RIGHTSOF-'V A Y AND OTHER REAL PROPER TY - The commission is authorized to acquire any real property or interests therein,
deemed necessary for temporary, present, or
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reasonable future state highway purposes by
gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in
this act shall include, but shall not be limited to
the fallowing:
( 3) Limited access facilities, including rights
of access, air, light and view, and frontage and
service roads to highways.
27-12-99 - ACQUISITION OF ENTIRE
LOT, BLOCK OR TRACT - SALE OF
REl\:IAINDER - 'Vhenever a part of an entire
lot, block or tract of land or interests therein or
improvements thereon is to be acquired by the
commission and the remainder is to be left in
such shape or condition as to be of little value to
its owner or to give rise to claims or litigation
concerning damages, the commission may acquire
the whole of the same and may ull the remainder
or may exchange the same for other property
needed for highway purposes.
(I talics added)

It is clear that the vast impact of the Federal highway system sponsored the foregoing legislation in Utah
and many other states, and that it provided that the
plaintiff could have either ( 1) condemned or otherwise
acquired an access to defendants' remaining properties
from other possible routes (as it obviously tried to do),
or (2) it could have made an outright purchase of the
physically landlocked properties of defendants. However, rather than follow either of the procedures provided by statute, plaintiff sought to unfairly gamble
with defendants in the hope of leaving the problem with
the defendants-and at a minimum cost to itself.
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The statute is amply clear that plaintiff could have
purchased the landlocked properties and then resold
them, had it felt the access problem was not severe, and
thereby reduced its costs. Also, since the pleadings
(as shown on the maps which accompany the Complaint
for the purpose of showing the route of the highway
and the properties affected) clearly show that the lands ·
of Ezra Bingham (a brother) and other individuals
lying to the north of defendants were also being acquired for highway purposes, it would have been a
very simple matter for plaintiff to have added to the
lands taken from such other individuals enough addi·
tional lands to furnish these defendants with an access ,
to their remaining properties had the plaintiff so concluded. The only conclusion which can be reached under
the evidence from the failure of the plaintiff to act consistent with its statutory authority is that the Road
Commission long ago decided that it was impractical
to attempt to secure access to the landlocked properties
from either the east side (where the high bank was
located) or from a northerly approach.
Citing the Mississippi case of Highway Commission v. Morgan, 175 So. 2d 606 (Miss. 1965), which
contains statutory provisions similar to those of Utah,
just previously set forth, the general rule is stated in
26 American Jurisprudence 2nd, Sec. 72, as follows:
"Also, it has been held that a state may prop·
erly condemn land ... for the purpose of furnishing a means of access to and egress from
parcels of private property cut off by a limited-
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access highway. In matters of this kind, it is
recognized that the public officials exercising the
power of eminent domain ought undoubtedly to
minimize the damage as far as is reasonably
possz'bl e, ... ,,
(Emphasis added).
The same rule is stated in 2 Nichols on Eminent
Domain in Sec. 7.226 where, concerning the issue of
whether or not substitute lands may be acquired by
eminent domain by a condemnor in the same or in a
supplemental proceeding for the use of an owner, the
question was stated:
" ... Is such a secondary acquisition of property to be considered for a public use?
"The question has been answered in the affirmative not only in jurisdictions which subscribe
to the liberal interpretation of 'public use' but
even in those where. the narrow doctrine ordinarily prevails ... "
In concluding the discussion relating to mitigation
of damages, it is submitted that this Court should further consider the general situation present in this country today where eminent domain proceedings are simply
flooding the courts and reluctant property owners are
being forced to litigate what they consider unsatisfactory offers. Faced with access problems of the type
here involved, is it really fair to shift the burden of
mitigating damages in such uncertain and involved
situations to landowners who must pay their own legal
expenses, hire expert appraisals, and stand many costs
which are not compensated for under the law-par-
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ticularly where the State has been provided with ample
statutory authority and means to work out remedial
measures in situations of this very type? Eminent
domain as a pp lied to property owners is a harsh proceeding brought in derogation of the most fundamental
legal concept-i.e., ownership of real property-underlying the common law. And, as the complexities of
problems involving damages become greater with the
advent of limited- and non-access highways, it becomes
abundantly clear that justice requires the greater burden respecting mitigation of damages to be faced by
the condemnor.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTAB·
LISHED THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD
NOT HA VE SECURED ANY COMP ARABLE
ACCESS TO THEIR REMAINING LANDS
WHICH WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY
ELI~fINATED THEIR SEVERANCE DAM·
AGES.
As pointed out in the preceding point of argument,
any access which defendants might have secured to
their remaining 6.44 acre parcel of land from either
the east side or the north side would have to be substantially comparable and of such type as to place
defendants basically in a position such as they enjoyed
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before. This is the clear mandate of the Church Farm
and the Carlson cases, supra, and the City of St. Louis
case. The facts of this case-even if a substitute access
could in fact have been secured-much more nearly fit
the situation of Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur,
supra, since any possible means of access would not
return the damaged tract to its status quo ante capiendum.
The facts and argument set forth in defendants'
discussion under the preceding point clearly establish
the utter lack of feasibility, both from the standpoint
of cost and limitations upon use, of any possible approach over the large bank running along the east side
above 1500 West Street. That possibility was considered both by the landowners and by the plaintiff's
engineer. Consequently, the only possible remaining
route from the remaining tract to a highway system
of any kind lay in a northerly direction. As to such
a route, defendants submit ( 1) that in fact it was not
arnilable, and (2) that, even if it were available, the
costs and other factors surrounding such a route would
prove it to be grossly inadequate as a comparable suitable substitute access.
Mr. Bingham testified on direct examination that
he did in fact consider trying to secure a route to the
north from his brothers (T. 24), but that he was unable
to do so. He pointed out ( T. 24) that the first property
to the north of him was owned by his brother 1;.zra,
and his wife, Helen; and that his brother was not anxious
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to sell at the time. Further, the brother indicated that
the sale of a right-of-way would ruin " ... either end
of my property ... ", and that Roland Bingham would
have to buy it all or nothing (T. 25). Although no
price was set for the adjoining pr~perties-obviously
since any sale would require the concurrence of Ezra's
wife, Helen-an examination of Exhibit I clearly
shows a parcel of at least the same size as the remain·
ing tract belonging to these defendants. Further, the
record indicates the value of the lands of these defendants, and it can hardly be imagined that the lands of
Ezra Bingham (together with the home and buildings
thereon) would sell at any less price per acre.
However, and notwithstanding the remote posssibility of being able to deal with his brother, Roland
Bingham pointed out that the relationships between
himself and his wife with Ezra's wife had been some·
what strained in recent years (T. 25). Mr. Bingham
pointed out that their families had not associated socially
"in years", and that so long as each stayed on his own
ground there were no problems, " ... but if we don't
there is." Roland Bingham pointed out that he had
not visited Ezra or his wife in their home, nor had he
ever been in their home, since 1951.
Mr. Bingham did not testify as to whether or not
he could have secured an access through the properties
of his brother, Golden Bingham, lying north of the
properties of Ezra and Helen Bingham, which prop·
erties would have to be crossed ( T. 26, 100) in order
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to reach 1200 West Street, since such further investigation would obviously appear to be wasted time.
Nor do we have any evidence as to what price he would
have had to pay Golden Bingham for his lands, or
a portion thereof, including any allowance for damages
to those lands or to the home of Golden Bingham and
the outbuildings surrounding the home.
Another problem presented itself in that any possible access from the defendants' remaining tract in
a northerly direction could only reach 1500 West Street
from an indefinite point farther north, and by an obviously circuitous route (as can be seen from an examination of Exhibit I) necessary to drop off the bench
properties down to that road, or else the route would
have had to proceed northerly to an intersection with
1200 'Vest Street. As to this latter street, the freeway
intersected it completely, and the portion of 1200 West
Street lying east of the freeway (and northerly of
the properties belonging to the brothers and wives)
was thereby made a dead-end road. On Exhibit I that
portion of 1200 West Street was shown on the State's
map (Exh. 1) as: "1200 WEST STREET ABANDON (ED) EAST OF FREE,VAY." Accordingly,
any access to that former road system would naturally
have questionable future upkeep, service, utility and
legal status as a road.
Coming to the next aspect of this portion of the
argument, let us assume that somehow an actual roadway could have been secured from the two brothers
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from a northerly direction to the remammg tract of
these defendants. Because of the steep bank running
on the west side of 1500 'Vest Street, and because of
the angle of 1200 West Street in a northeasterly direction, it is rather obvious that the roadway would have
to be designed so as to enter near the northwest corner
of the landlocked property. Under the evidence, and
from a knowledge of a few simple facts present in all
such situations, defendants submit that plaintiff is
simply exercising wild hopes when it states (Br. 7)
that " ... if access was available they would have no
severance damage." Such a statement is both disputed
and unsupportable.
An analysis of this problem must first consider the
highest and best use of the subject properties for residential subdivision purposes (T. 47, 83, 84), with an
interim productive use of orchard purposes during the
transitional period. Accordingly, any access which
would meet the tests of the Church Farm case and the
Carlson case would necessarily have to substantially
satisfy both uses. Also let's look at some simple facts:
common sense and a drive through a subdivision will
point out that any road from a northerly direction to
the landlocked tract would have to proceed southerly
from 1200 West Street at a sufficient distance from
the freeway fence as would permit the placing of lots
on both sides of the street. This is so because certain
utilities-such as water mains and sewer mains-must
serve lots on both sides in order for the construction
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costs of such improvements to be practical in any sense.
This is also true as to street graveling, grading and
hard surfacing. 'Ve are thus left with the conclusion
that any access would have to come down to the landlocked piece from the north at a distance from the freeway fence which would put it out into the fields of
Golden Bingham and Ezra Bingham. Not only would
this constitute an expensive matter in terms of land
costs (a severance damage to be considered) to these
defendants, but one can readily imagine the severance
damaged caused to the properties of the two brothers
of these defendants (which, also, would be measured as
part of the damages to these defendants' propertiesordinarily measured on the basis of a "cost-to-cure"
approach). Such damages become obvious because a
roadway in their fields would disrupt the irrigation
patterns of the lands involved, would result in a reduction in size of the orchard properties belonging to the
brothers ( T. 26) , and would cross an area where young
Christmas trees have been planted (T. 26)-thereby
reducing the size of the economic units of the brothers
and making them less productive.
Mr. Bingham's appraiser, George Maw, stated
that, except for the 6.44 acre tract being smaller-and
harder to develop, the remainder of the damages would
not have been present if the tract in fact had " . . .
the same accessibility, . . . " that it previously had.
However, Mr. Maw could not find any possibility of
securing the "same accessibility" ( T. 7 4) .
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Considering another aspect of the possibility of
a route from the north to the 6.44 acre tract, in addition to the cost of the land for such a route (and severance damages caused to the lands of the property
owners giving up such a route) there is the further
problem of whether such a route would be as good
in fact as the frontage this same property previously
enjoyed. As heretofore stated, the 6.44 acre tract was
connected through the freeway area in its former condition to 1200 'Vest Street, where all necessary utilities
were located. Any orderly development of the original
property would have started at the broad frontage on
1200 West Street and progressed orderly to the east.
The future situation would not be that simple because
it now appears that, even with a possible access road
from the north, the 6.44 acre tract is at a much farther
distance from any regularly travelled and maintained
road system. It is obvious that this condition would
defer development and reduce the value, for that rea·
son alone, of the 6.44 acre tract. Also, common know!·
edge tells us that it would take several thousand dollars
just to extend the sewer mains, water mains, streets,
and other necessary utilities from the subject property
which is landlocked to a point where there can be
secured available services from existing streets and
utility improvements.
As for the aspect of damage involving the severed
6.44 acre tract for future use as an orchard, both Mr.
Bingham (T. 27, 28) and his expert witness, Mr. Baum
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(T. 98) pointed out that the travel considerations, loca-

tion, and the reduced size of that remaining tract all
tended to diminish its value for its interim orchard
use.
It is easy to see that the access problem-even if
a route could have in fact been secured from a northerly
or other direction-could well constitute a lawsuit in
itself to determine the cost of an alternate access
through a substitute route. The additional costs-which
would be measured as a severance aspect in this case
-would be both very substantial and in the realm of
a considerable amount of conjecture. It is a fair statement to say that the injection of such a problem into
this case would really open Pandora's box; likewise,
it is easy to see why the plaintiff did not take upon
itself the problem of securing for Mr. Bingham a route
from a northerly direction.

Perhaps Mr. Bingham's last appraiser, Thomas
Baum, should be 9uoted at this point concerning this
matter on his direct examination, particularly since he
sets forth some of the problems involved ( T. 98-99) :

Q. As to the land east of the freeway, explain
to the jury the reasons for reducing the value
as you did.

A. The reason that I reduced the value on the
remaining property, I used the rule of what
a willing buyer would pay for that property
in its present condition, after the date of
acquisition. And of course I recognized that
there is serious access problems to the prop-
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erty, either for any kind of a residential development or for its continued use as a orchard. I also recognized that the property is
smaller now, and less economic to use either
as an orchard or as a subdivision devel9pment. There would be a higher percentage
of the property in roads, in a subdivision development. There would be less interest from
the standpoint of prospective developers near
a small property like that, than there would
have been in the total property, with all the
utilities present in the street. This way he
would have a small property, and be faced
with the necessity of bringing utilities to the
property, including the street.

Q. Did you consider on this problem of access,
the apparently available 20'-length at the
upper northeast corner of the property?

I,
1

:
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1
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I

,

~
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A. Yes, I took that into consideration.
Q. And explain the effect you gave that in your
deliberations.

A. I was concerned with this access for several
reasons. One, the only feasible method of get·
ting into the property is over someone else's
property, even though the 20 foot is still
available. Too, that would involve possibly
a severance damage to the property owner
whose property you acquired the frontage
from. I was concerned about it because there
are easements over that edge of the property
that involve several property owners on down '
the line.
Then there is a water line that proceeds down
over the upper edge of the high embank· '
ment, there is also an irrigation ditch, and
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these things are expensive when other adjustments have to be made for the movement
of irrigation water to the adjoining farms
on to the south.
I was further concerned by the steepness of
the approach to the property, and its undesirability. I have contacted the people who
owned the corner property, and they're not
anxious to have their property used as an
access to the above property, and I recognize
that there is going to be a prospective purchaser acquiring that property that is going
to be faced-if he develops the proper access-with the necessity of a lawsuit to develop a good access to the property, and that
is an expensive item, and a thing that people
won't take unwillingly.
Q. Did you consider that in the event somehow
one could get in thl'.ough this 20-foot area,
that that would be suitable width for a subdivision entry road?
A. I didn't consider that direct access to the
street to be suitable for any use.
None of the landowners' witnesses considered that
the landlocked parcel was valueless after the taking;
rather, the landowners' appraisers placed a per-acre
value on the remaining tract of $1,000.00 and $1,100.00,
respectively; the plaintiff's expert witness placed a
remaining value on the tract on a per-acre basis of
$1,500.00. Concerning the residual value of the 6.44
acre tract, Mr. Baum again testified on direct examination (T. 100-101):
Q. Considering your remaining value of $1,000
an acre for that piece, tell the Court and jury
33

why you arrived at that value, and your gen. ,
eral reasons for it.
I

A. Well, there are quite a number of reason~. I
First of all I put myself in a position of a !
purchaser, and attempted to analyze as best
I could a buyer that I took out to examine !
the property. And since I have had a lot of
experience showing buyers-not only the ·
ones that buy, but the ones that don't buy1 drew from my experience. Secondly, I ana- ,
lyzed the costs that would go through a buy.
er's mind in acquiring this remaining property. Part of them I had mentioned.
i
I feel that most buyers are not willing to I
buy a lawsuit in the acquisition of property.
They'd much rather acquire property that',
these indeterminables are not present in. I /
felt that there was some residual value in the
property, in that you could walk onto the'
property, you could rise a horse onto it, and i
it may Jiave some use at some time. People I
would buy it for an investment, to the extent I
that I felt that they would pay $1,000.00 for :1
the property.
[
'
1

1
,

1

•

Q. You mean per acre?

I

A. Per acre. I felt that the costs of acquisition'
of a right-of-way would involve something:
in the neighborhood of $1,500.00 an acre. l '1
also felt that the property is less valuable l
in its smaller size than it was before, ana 11
where it was probably-Well, if there was
adequate access to it, the property wou!O
still not be worth $4,200.00 an acre as a sub·.
division property, because it's smaller, 1! 1
would take a higher percentage of it for r.o~~s. ,
it would be more costly to get the utihtie~
34

to it than it would in its former condition.
It was an ideal property formerly for an
efficient development.
Quite often considerable assistance can be furnished by analyzing the testimony of the expert appraisal witness for the opposition. In this respect Mr.
Solomon, who was the expert valuation witness for the
plaintiff-like Mr. Marsden-gave rather interesting
testimony which does not appear to support the plaintiff's position ( T. 137) :
Q. Now is your opinion based upon the assumption that there would be no access possible
to this land at the present time from the
north?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And have youA. Oh, pardon me. No possible access. That
there is no legally available access.

Q. At the present time?
A. There is a possible access, yes.
Q. And it is based upon the assumption that at
the present time there is no legal access from
the property immediately adjacent on the
east, in this little white triangle? (Indicating)
A. No, sir. It is my assumption that there is
the possibility of a development at the extreme northeast corner of an access into the
property that can be developed.
Based upon the foregoing assumptions Mr. Solomon testified that for the highest and best use of the
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property for subdivision purposes the per-acre value
of the 6.44 acres (as part of the 9.4 acres) was $3,500.0o
per acre ( T. 139). He then outlined his reasons for
reducing the value of the 6.44 acres immediately after
the taking in the condition in which it was left, and
then valued it at $1,500.00 per acre, or a total severance
damage strictly applicable to the 6.44 acres of $2,000.00
per acre. In short, Mr. Solomon followed the same basic
approach of the other two appraisers as to damages
to the 6.44 acre tract in arriving at his "after" value
of $1,500.00 per acre (T. 138). The only real difference between Mr. Solomon's approach and that of the
two expert a pp raisers for the property owners is that
Mr. Solomon was somewhat less on the "before" value
of the land and slightly higher on the "after" value
of the 6.44 acre tract remaining.

An analysis of l\!Ir. Solomon's reduction in value
from $3,500.00 to $1,500.00 per acre indicates that he
assigned what in effect amounted to a 57% damage
from the original value of the subject property. If that
same percentage of damage were applied to the ap·
praisal values of the lands before the taking of $4,500.00 :
per acre (Mr. Maw) or $4,200.00 per acre (Mr. Baum),
the final severance award of $17,281.00 would be sub· :
stantiated, within a very few hundred dollars, upon I
Mr. Solomon's own approach. In other words, a 57%
reduction in value, based on a "before" per acre value
1
of $4,500.00 (as determined by the jury), multiplied
by 6.44 acres (plus an item of $285.00 damages to 1

1
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remaining properties west of the freeway) would constitute a total of $16,803.00. Considering the severe
nature of the problem incurred, it is rather amazing
that the two appraisers for the property owners and
the one appraiser for the plaintiff came up with appraisal approaches so nearly comparable in an area of
such difficulty. Further, Mr. Solomon's approach to
damages conflicts with that of his client.

CONCLUSION
From an analysis of this case it is rather obvious
that there was no reasonable means of access to the 6.44
acre tract of land which was effectively landlocked
by reason of the highway construction. Accordingly,
both because (I) there was not in fact a suitable alternate access which could have been secured, and ( 2)
any such access that might have been secured would
not have materially reduced the severance damages
in this case, the Church Farm case and the Carlson case
have no application to the situation before this Court.
Even if defendants were required to sustain a burden
of proof-which it is submitted is not the rule of law,
as pointed out previously in this brief-the burden was
amply met by the defendants.
Complaint is made by the plaintiff that the Court
refused to furnish the jury an instruction relating to
mitigation of damages and burden of proof. It is the
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position of these defendants that such an instruction
does not conform to the law and that, in any event, the
matter of damages was adequately covered in the gen.
eral instructions given by the Court relating to the
measure of damages in a case of this type-Instructions
4, 5 and 7. In this respect it should be pointed out that
the plaintiff submitted approximately 13 instructions
of its own to the Court, but it did not see fit to submit
a written instruction to the Court relative to the matter
of severance damages and any burden of proof relative
to the efforts of the defendants in securing alternate
access to their remaining properties. If plaintiff had
felt that issue to have been of importace in the case,
one would think that it would have prepared and sub·
mitted a formal instruction covering the point.
It is submitted that the jury award in this matter
was well within the evidence, that the lower Court was
correct in denying the motion made by plaintiff for
a new trial, and that all other rulings of the lower Court
were proper.

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR.
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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